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Divorce and Remarriage As Human
Rights: The Irish Constitution and
the European Convention on
Human Rights At Odds In
Johnston v. Ireland
Introduction
In Ireland, divorce is unconstitutional. Since the enactment of the con-
stitution in 1937, Irish law has rejected any efforts to dissolve the unity
of marriage. In Johnston v. Ireland, Roy Johnston and his new family'
challenged the Irish ban on divorce in the European Court of Human
Rights, claiming Irish law violated their rights to found a family, enjoy
their privacy, practice their religion, and be free from discrimination.
The European Court of Human Rights rejected the Johnstons'
claim that the Irish legal system violated the European Convention on
Human rights. Nevertheless, the court granted their daughter some
relief. The court ordered Ireland to equalize the legal treatment of all
children under Irish law, regardless of the marital status of the child's
parents. This holding was a partial remedy for theJohnstons' daughter
Nessa,2 and did nothing to aid her parents.
Given Ireland's strong opposition to divorce, it is unlikely that the
European Court, an international body, could have enforced a decision
for the Johnstons. The Johnston case points out the tacit limits on the
court's power and its ultimate usefulness. Although the European Con-
vention on Human Rights protects fundamental individual rights, the
court inJohnston faced a situation where the claimants' interests directly
opposed the Irish constitution.
This Note examines the background of the Johnston case and the
propriety of the European Court of Human Rights decision. Part I sum-
marizes Ireland's political and religious divisions that shape the Irish law
of divorce and related family matters. Parts II and III discuss the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and theJohnston v. Ireland decision
1. Roy Johnston had been legally separated from his wife and three children for
several years when he met Janice Williams-Johnston. Seven years later they had a
daughter, Nessa. They wished to marry, but in Ireland Johnston could not obtain a
divorce from his first wife.
2. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
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itself. The Note concludes in Part IV that Johnston was wrongly decided.
The European Court of Human Rights should have protected the indi-
vidual claimants in Johnston, not the established Irish regime. The court
should have found that the Irish constitutional bar to divorce violates
the Convention and should have protected divorce as a human right.
I. Ireland: Political, Religious, and Legal Background
A. Historical Divisions
Ireland is the only major Western European nation that has retained its
ban on divorce.3 While the prohibition on divorce is undoubtedly
linked to the heavy influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland,4
religion alone fails to provide a complete explanation. 5 Politics also
plays a large role. In Ireland, religion and politics are often inexorably
mixed.6 This section traces the recent history of the religious and polit-
ical divisions of the Irish isle, focusing on the events leading up to and
including the absolute ban on divorce in the Irish Constitution.
From Norman times in the eleventh century until 1922, an English
government ruled Ireland.7 The crown granted many English nobles
estates in Ireland, and many Protestant settlers moved to the growing
port towns in the North.8 While the indigenous Catholic majority
remained concentrated in the poorer, agrarian South, the wealthier
Protestant minority stayed largely in the northeastern area of the Irish
Isle.9
In 1922, after centuries of British rule and several failed com-
promises with Britain, 10 Ireland gained independence.1 I Great Britain
retained control of the six northeastern counties of Ulster which became
3. Duncan, Ireland: Waiting for Divorce, 25J. FAM. L. 155 (1986-87).
4. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
5. Other predominantly Catholic nations have eased their divorce restrictions.
Spain, for example, allowed divorce beginning in 1981. Duncan, supra note 3, at 155.
Argentina passed legislation in 1987, codifying a 1986 Argentina Supreme Court rul-
ing allowing divorce. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1987, § I, at 2, col. 4.
6. One need only look to the continuing violence in Northern Ireland between
Catholics and Protestants to see that the dispute has moved beyond religious differ-
ences. The recent uproar over the proposed agreement for joint British/Irish rule of
Northern Ireland further illustrates the political and economic factors involved in
what is ostensibly a religious conflict. See M. O'BRIEN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF IRE-
LAND 166-76 (1985).
7. Id. at 39.
8. Id. at 61-76.
9. Hogan, Law and Religion: Church-State Relations in Ireland from Independence to the
Present Day, 35 AM. J. ComP. L. 47, 48 (1987).
10. For a discussion of several Irish reform movements in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, see generally M. O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 123-152.
11. R. GRIMES & P. HORGAN, INTRODUCTION TO LAW IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
49 (1981). Grimes and Horgan note that the date of independence is difficult to fix.
The signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 officially set the date of independence,
but the treaty was strongly opposed by some, and in large part led to the Irish Civil
War of 1921-1923 over the extent of British control in Ireland. Id. See generally J.
MURPHY, IRELAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 27-60 (1975).
Vol. 22
1989 Divorce & The European Convention
Northern Ireland.' 2 The new Irish nation, the Irish Free State, encom-
passed the largely Catholic southern counties that form modem Ire-
land.' 3 The Irish Free State, founded by a Catholic nationalist group,
left open the possibility of unification with Northern Ireland by adopting
an officially nonsectarian constitution.' 4
B. Legal Framework
1. The 1937 Constitution
From 1922 to 1937, political parties vying for power in Ireland strug-
gled with each other and the new constitution. In those fifteen years
Parliament's power structure changed, and the constitution was
amended twenty-seven times. 15 Fianna Fail, the major opposition
republican party, combined forces with Sinn Fein, another more radical
republican party, to gain control of the Dail, or parliament.' 6 Fianna
Fail, strongly Catholic, perceived all attempts to bring the North into the
Union as futile and even undesirable. 17 Fianna Fail pushed for com-
plete Irish independence and separation from Britain.' 8 In 1937, with
the 1922 constitution becoming increasingly unworkable, the parties in
power drafted a new constitution. 19 The new constitution abandoned
the earlier document's silence on religious issues. There was no longer
a need to appease groups outside the Catholic, republican majority.20
12. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 established the two areas of Ulster and the
Republic but provided a Boundary Commission, ostensibly to examine the border
line with an eye toward moving it to include the Catholic residents of Ulster in the
Republic. In practice, however, no such change occurred. M. O'BRIEN, supra note 6,
at 150.
13. In 1922 ninety percent of the inhabitants of the Irish Free State were Roman
Catholics. Hogan, supra note 9, at 50.
14. For example, the constitution made no mention of divorce. See J. WH=TE,
CHURCH AND STATE IN MODERN IRELAND: 1923-1979 at 51 (2d ed. 1980); A. SHATrER,
FAMILY LAW IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 144-45 (1981). Hogan, supra note 9, at 53.
15. Hogan, supra note 9, at 53. The constitution may be amended by the people
through referendum. IR. CONST., art. 47. The referendum must originate in the Dail
Eireann, or lower house of Parliament, and then pass both houses. Id. The public
must then approve the proposed amendment by a simple majority in a popular refer-
endum. Id. There is no public initiation of constitutional amendments. B. DOOLAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN IRELAND 5-6 (1984).
16. Hogan, supra note 9, at 51-53. See A. SHATTER, supra note 14, at 144-45.
17. Recall that the North was largely Protestant and Unionist (desiring political
union with Britain). Any alliance between North and South would have demanded
compromises that the revolutionary republicans were perhaps unwilling to grant.
Hogan, supra note 9, at 50-55.
18. Id. at 52.
19. Fianna Fail, with its leader Eamonn de Valera, was the major force in framing
the new constitution. J. MURPHY, supra note 11, at 88-99; Hogan, supra note 9, at 52-
54.
20. Hogan explains how the constitution appears to exclude non-Catholics from
the tone of its preamble:
The preamble to the constitution recites, inter alia: "We the People of Eire
humbly acknowledge all our obligations to our Divine LordJesus Christ, who
sustained our fathers through centuries of trial ... do hereby adopt, enact
and give ourselves this Constitution." The reference to Jesus Christ sus-
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In particular, the 1937 constitution included three pro-Catholic
articles not found in the 1922 constitution, all of which remain in effect
today. Article 44 nominally established national religious toleration, but
at the same time recognized the "special position" of the Roman Catho-
lic Church. 2 ' Article 42 recognized parents as the "primary and natural
educator[s]" of children. 22 Finally, article 41 promoted the traditional
family and prohibited divorce. 23
Section 41.3.2 of the 1937 constitution provides "No law shall be
enacted providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage."2 4 Other
sections of article 41 recognized the family as the "natural primary" unit
of society and assured citizens that the state will "protect the Family...
as the necessary basis of social order." 2 5
2. Judicial Inteipretation of the 1937 Constitution
Although the Irish courts have played an active role in expanding per-
sonal rights beyond the plain language of the constitution in some
areas, 2 6 they have limited constitutional protection of non-marital fami-
lies. Despite increasing marriage breakdown and the resulting increase
in non-marital relationships and families, 2 7 the courts have resisted rec-
ognizing the rights of those outside traditional family units. In State
(Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtala,28 the Irish Supreme Court held that article
41 of the constitution protects only the marital family. 29
taining "our fathers through centuries of trial" is a clear reference to the
religious persecution suffered by Catholics in Ireland in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. One might reasonably infer that non-Catholics did not
really belong to "the people of Eire."
Hogan, supra note 9, at 55 n.17.
21. IR. CONST., art. 44.
22. IR. CONST., art. 42.
23. IR. CONST., art. 41. Divorce is expressly prohibited by Catholic doctrine. A.
SHArrER, supra note 14, at 145-47.
24. IR. CONST., § 41.3.2.
25. IR. CONST., §§ 41.1.1, 41.1.2. A new draft constitution, proposed by the Pro-
gressive Democratic Party, eliminates both the express prohibition on divorce as well
as references to God and religion. Draft Constitution, discussed in Machey, A Constitu-
tion for a New Republic, Irish Law Times 64 (1988). The Draft's preamble omits refer-
ences to the trinity and Jesus Christ found in the 1937 constitution, stating instead
that the people of Ireland "affirm the inalienable, indefensible and sovereign right of
the Irish Nation to choose its own form of Government .. " Draft Constitution, id.
The Draft promises to protect both the marital and non-marital family. Article 2.10
of the Draft also guarantees the equal legal status of all children regardless of parent-
age. Draft Constitution, id. The Draft Constitution proposes important changes in
Irish family law. However, it faces almost insurmountable hurdles prior to becoming
law. Given the public opposition to the Irish divorce referendum, see infra notes 70-
96 and accompanying text, such changes would not come easily.
26. Ryan v. Attorney General, 1965 I.R. 294. Many fundamental personal rights
protected by the Irish courts are not enumerated in the constitution. Id
27. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text for statistical evidence of marital
breakdown.
28. 1966 I.R. 567. "An Bord Uchtala" is Irish for "the Adoption Board."
29. Id. at 590.
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The court's refusal to expand the meaning of "family" has affected
not only the adults in non-marital relationships, but their children as
well. Although the Irish High Court has stated that the constitution pro-
tects illegitimate and legitimate children equally with regard to the
child's "personal rights to life, to be fed, to be protected, to be reared
and educated,"3 0 in other disputes the court has continued to distin-
guish between legitimate and illegitimate children. 3 '
Inheritance law is one important area in which illegitimate children
are treated differently. In 1984, in O'B. v. S.,32 the Supreme Court
upheld the Succession Act of 1965,33 barring illegitimate children from
inheriting. The court held that references to the statutory definition of
"child" did not include the illegitimate child.3 4 The court dismissed the
plaintiff's constitutional claim that the Act unfairly discriminated against
children outside of marriage by stating that the constitution placed an
affirmative duty on the state to protect the marital family.3 5
3. Statutory Law Affecting Family and Divorce
In addition to judicial interpretation of the meaning of family and mar-
riage under the constitution, Irish statutory law further enforces pre-
ferred treatment of the marital family. Under Irish law, unmarried
persons have no duty to maintain their partners, 3 6 and partners do not
have any rights of succession.3 7 While there is no express barrier to
maintenance arrangements or inter vivos transfers, preexisting duties to
the spouse and marital children may thwart such efforts.3 8
30. M v. M. (Ir. H. Ct. Dec. 2, 1982) (unreported) (cited in Hogan, supra note 9, at
89). This statement by the High Court arguably is dicta. The narrow holding was
that the mother of a child born outside marriage has a constitutional right to custody.
31. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
32. 1984 I.R. 316.
33. Succession Act, No. 27 (1965).
34. O'B v. S. 1984 I.R. 316, 329-31. The plaintiff was the daughter of an unmar-
ried couple who lived together for thirty-five years. Id. at 318.
35. Id. at 318. While treating illegitimate children as "nobody's child" and hence
barring them from inheriting from anyone was common in many Western nations,
including the United States, most officially abandoned the doctrine ten to twenty
years ago. Even while adhering to it, few if any did so on the basis of a constitutional
provision. R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 169-75, 213-14 (1978). See infra
notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
36. A. SHATrER, supra note 14, at 363-77.
37. Succession Act, No. 27 (1965). See O'B. v. S., 1984 I.R. 316. See supra note 32
and accompanying text.
38. For example, RoyJohnston could not supportJanice Williams-Johnston at the
expense of his spouse or children from his marriage. Also, maintenance agreements
are less secure because they may be struck down as defective or ended by agreement.
See 1983 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTs. 135 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
In the United States, the issue in evaluating succession rights of non-marital family
members has not been whether the alternatives are available but whether allowing
differentiation on the basis of status alone is equitable. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977) (exclusion of illegitimate child from father's estate violates equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. Constitution). See infra note
183 and accompanying text.
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The Family Law Act of 1981, which provides for summary remedies
for domestic violence, does not apply to the non-marital family.3 9 Non-
marital families do not enjoy the benefits of marital families under the
social welfare system.40 The Family Home Protection Act of 1976,41
which prohibits the sale of the home without the consent of both
spouses, also excludes the non-marital family. 4 2 In all, Irish statutory
law differentiates considerably between marital and non-marital
families .43
Ireland, nevertheless, has recently made some progressive changes
regarding the status of illegitimate children. The Status of Children Act
(1987) became law onJune 14, 1988. The statute is new and will doubt-
less face constitutional challenges, but section 29 of the Act allows ille-
gitimate children to share equally with legitimate children in a
decedant's estate under the laws of intestate succession.4 4 Illegitimate
children may also apply for provision under a will.4 5 Part IV of the Act
brings illegitimate children within the protection of the Irish Family Law
(Maintenance of Spouses and Children Act (1976)).46 The Act provides
general relief to illegitimate children by stating "relationships are to be
determined irrespective of whether a person's father and mother are or
have been married to each other."'4 7 Despite this broad language, the
Act does allow some distinctions among parents based on marital
status.
48
The Status of Children Act appears quite progressive, but it faces
strong constitutional challenges. 49 Even if the Act passes constitutional
muster, it fails to alleviate the social stigma children born out of wedlock
suffer. Permitting divorce, however, would allow couples to dissolve
prior unions and then remarry before having children. Divorce would
39. The Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, No. 11 (1976),
as amended by the Family Law (Protection of Spouses and Children) Act, No. 21
(1981), provides "barring orders," or summary orders to bar the violent spouse from
the family home. Unmarried persons must seek protection through the lengthier
injunction process before the High Court. The latter remedy is less accessible and
effective. 1983 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUm. RTs. 134 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.).
40. C.JENNINGS, WHO OWNS IRELAND--WHO OWNS YOU? 19-27 (1985). Jennings
suggests that an additional source of discrimination in the social welfare system
stems from defining women's status and welfare payments in accordance with their
relationship to men (e.g., widows, abandoned wives). Id. at 22.
41. Family Home Protection Act, No. 27 (1976).
42. Id.
43. Other legal disabilities for unmarried couples include unfavorable treatment
of transfers between them under the capital acquisitions tax. Capital Acquisition Tax
Act, No. 8 (1976). An unmarried couple is also prohibited from jointly adopting a
child. Adoption Act, No. 25 (1952).
44. Status of Children Act (1987), cited in Woulfe, Status of Children Act 1987 Comes
into Force, 6 Irish Law Times 133 (1988).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 133, summarizing Status of Children Act (1984).
48. Woulfe, supra note 44, at 133.
49. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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thus prevent the social stigmatization children such as Nessa Johnston
suffer.
4. Existing Ways to End Marriage in Ireland
a. Nullity
Absent domestic divorce, few options remain to bring a legal end to an
irretrievable marriage. 50 Under limited circumstances, one may seek to
nullify a marriage in the civil courts. While the Catholic Church and
Irish law do not allow the dissolution of a valid marriage, a grant of civil
nullity signifies that no valid marriage ever existed.5 1
In order for a marriage to be valid, the parties must have the legal
capacity to marry. Partners must be over sixteen years old, not already
married, and not related by blood.52 Additionally, the parties must fol-
low the formalities of marriage, including parental consent for those
under twenty-one and appropriate ceremonial procedures depending on
religious affiliation.5 3 Irish law considers a marriage null and void if one
or both of the parties lacked the capacity to marry or failed to observe
the necessary formalities. A marriage also is void if the parties did not
consent to marry, as shown by duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or
fraud.5 4 A different class of marriages that may be nullified is termed
the "voidable marriage." In order to have the union declared invalid
under the voidable marriage doctrine, one of the parties must show that
the other party was mentally ill, impotent, or a homosexual at the time
of marriage.5 5
Since 1976, Irish courts have broadened the grounds for civil nul-
50. Judicial separation is available in Ireland under limited circumstances.
Although separation does not end the marriage and hence will not enable the
spouses to remarry, it does, at least, relieve the partners from the duty to cohabitate.
Currently, judicial separation is governed by the century-old Matrimonial Causes and
Marriage Law Ireland (Amendment) Act, 1870. The Act allows separation only on
grounds of cruelty, adultery, or unnatural practices. This fault based approach "has
tended to encourage bitterness and conflict .. " WoulfeJudicial Separation and Fam-
ily Law Reform Bill, 1987, 6 Irish Law Times 79 (1988). A new bill, currently in a
special Dail committee for amendment, would add non-fault-based grounds for sepa-
ration. Judicial Separation and Family Reform Bill (1987), cited in Woulfe, supra at 80.
The new grounds for separation would include desertion for one year, informal sepa-
ration for one year with parties' consent, and separation for three years without con-
sent. Id. The Bill, which was introduced in December 1987, is currently in a special
committee "where it may well be substantially amended." Id. At this point, it is
impossible to predict if the Bill will leave committee or what form it will ultimately
take.
51. B. DOOLAN, PRINCIPLES OF IRISH LAw 221 (2d ed.1986).
52. Marriage Act, No. 30 (1972).
53. B. DOOLAN, supra note 51, at 221.
54. B. DooLAN, supra note 51. See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
55. B. DOOLAN, supra note 51, at 223-24. The difference between marriages void
and voidable is that in the latter the marriage remains valid until the party chooses to
end it. Presumably with "void" marriages, the court could sua sponte declare the mar-
riage invalid.
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lity, particularly in the psychological areas of duress or mental illness. 56
This expansion has led to an increasing acceptance of psychiatric illness
as grounds for nullity57 as well as a broader interpretation of other psy-
chological factors such as duress. In an example of the latter, the
Supreme Court held in N. (otherwise K.) v. K 58 that pressure from the
pregnant petitioner's parents to marry so influenced her that her deci-
sion to marry was made under duress and thus void.5 9 The court
rejected prior judicial definitions that limited duress to threats of physi-
cal or otherwise harmful consequences.60 Noting the irrevocable nature
of marriage in Ireland, the court held that the validity of marriage
depended upon a fully free exercise of the independent will of the
parties. 6 '
The court's recent liberalization of civil nullity as a means to cir-
cumvent the constitutional ban on divorce 62 may have already reached
its limits. Critics argue that the court's restatement of duress goes
beyond the accepted definition in Irish contract law.6 3 Despite the
expansion of duress and other grounds, nullity is still unavailable for
marriages that break down after the wedding for reasons unforeseeable
at the time of marriage, such as a later developing mental illness or a
couple's gradual growing apart.64 Today nullity remains a limited rem-
edy for relatively few couples.
Even if nullity were available in all cases, difficulties remain. Any
children from an annulled marriage would be illegitimate and hence
subject to unequal legal treatment. 65 If nullity increased dramatically,
so as to be readily available to void a marriage broken down by later
developing disabilities nominally present at the time of marriage but not
pressing until much later, one must consider whether Ireland arguably
would be left with only a tortured distinction between divorce and
nullity.
56. S. v. S. (Ir. S.C., July 1, 1976) (unreported) (laws of civil nullity open to
change with advancements in the study of psychology). See generally Hogan, supra
note 9, at 85; Duncan, Sex and the Fundamentals of Marriage, 1979-80 DUBLIN U. LJ. 29.
57. R.S.J. v.J.Sj., 1982 I.L.R.M. 263; D. v. C., 1984 I.L.R.M. 173 ("normal mar-
riage relationship" impossible); D.C. v. D.W., 1987 I.L.R.M. 58 (psychiatric illness at
time of marriage disabled petitioner from entering and sustaining normal marriage).
See generally Hogan, supra note 9, at 84-86.
58. 1986 I.L.R.M. 75.
59. Id. at 82-83.
60. Griffith v. Griffith, 1944 I.R. 35, cited in N. (otherwise K.) v. K., 1986 I.L.R.M.
75, 82, 89, 93.
61. N. (otherwise K.) v. K., 1986 I.L.R.M. at 82.
62. ChiefJustice Finlay noted in N. (otherwise K.) v. K., that since the Irish Con-
stitution bars divorce and makes "the contract of marriage absolutely irrevocable,"
parties must give consent freely. Id. Hence, the court was conscious of its decision as
an outlet for those bound to a marriage that, in the court's new interpretation, never
was a valid union.
63. Id. at 85 (Henchy, J., dissenting). "[T]he courts... have given a more liberal
scope to the doctrine of duress as a nullifying element than would be applied in the
construction of certain kinds of contract." Id.
64. A. SHrATrER, supra note 14, at 76-79.
65. Id. at 79. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
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b. Foreign Divorce
Another way to end a marriage in Ireland is for a couple to obtain a
foreign divorce. Such divorces are only available under limited circum-
stances. For a foreign divorce to be recognized in Ireland, the husband
must have been domiciled in the country in which the divorce is
obtained with the intent to remain indefinitely 66 and not merely for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce.6 7 Hence, the rules for the recognition
of a foreign divorce in Ireland may be more stringent than in the coun-
try that granted it.
If either spouse plans to remarry in Ireland after obtaining a foreign
divorce, he or she must overcome yet another obstacle. The Irish Regis-
trar-General must refer any application for marriage in Ireland involving
a divorced party to legal counsel to determine if the foreign divorce
requirements have been met.68 Both the foreign divorce and remar-
riage requirements place an enormous burden on Irish couples seeking
to obtain a divorce. While annulment or foreign divorce may offer the
possibility of relief from an unbearable marriage, they are unavailable to
most Irish couples.6 9
C. Divorce in the Modem Context: The Referendum
The Irish constitutional prohibition of divorce has failed to prevent mar-
ital breakdown and the formation of non-traditional families. An esti-
mated 72,000 unmarried couples live together in Ireland, 70 and in 1986,
more than 9,000 women received deserted wives' social welfare pay-
ments. 7 1 The number of single-parent families has increased dramati-
cally in the past years. Similarly, the number of women receiving
Ireland's unmarried mother's allowance trebled in the past ten years
from 3,800 in 1977 to 11,500 in 1985.72
66. B. DoOLAN, supra note 51, at 226. The "domicile of spouses is decided by the
husband. While a wife may live in another country her domicile remains Irish as long
as her husband lives [in Ireland). Any change in her status may not be recognised in
[Irish] courts." Id. Such a requirement makes it virtually impossible for a woman to
obtain a foreign divorce against her husband's wishes. This illustrates the limited
utility of foreign divorce as a means for avoiding the divorce ban as well as the male-
centered Irish society in connection with social welfare. Supra note 40.
67. See A. SHATrER, supra note 14, at 159.
68. Id.
69. Johnston is an illustration of the inadequacies of relief. One of the bases of the
European Court of Human Rights jurisdiction is lack of a domestic remedy. Neither
the court nor the commission questioned this element in Johnston, despite the appli-
cant's failure to challenge the constitutional provision in domestic Irish courts. John-
ston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) (1986), at para. 44-46.
70. Menendez, Down the Emerald Aisle: Irish Voters Reaffirm Church-State Marriage in
Divorce Referendum, 39 CHURCH & ST. 175 (Sept. 1986).
71. Irish Times, June 21, 1986, at 8, col. 1.
72. Irish Times, June 23, 1986, at 8, col. 1.
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1. The Referendum Debate
To address the problems of marital breakdown, several groups have
sought to revise the constitution to allow divorce in some circum-
stances. 73 A national referendum to amend the constitution to allow
divorce reached the ballot on June 26, 1986. 74 The proposed amend-
ment permitted divorce only when the marriage had failed for five years
with no possibility of reconciliation.75 It also authorized the court to
require that the party seeking divorce support a dependent spouse and
any dependent children.76
The referendum sparked debate on a number of issues connected
with divorce and highlighted Ireland's political and religious divisions.
The debate centered on four closely linked topics: the Catholic
Church's proper role in the debate, 77 the possibility that allowing
divorce would pave the way for a united Ireland,78 the potential practi-
cal effects of divorce, 79 and the humanitarian need for compassion in
allowing divorce.8 0 While Irish voters rejected the proposed amend-
ment by a wide margin,8 ' the referendum debate shed light on this
explosive, emotional issue.
a. Church and State: The Role of the Catholic Hierarchy in the
Referendum Debate
The Catholic Church strongly opposed the amendment and is credited
73. A. SHA-rrER, supra note 14, at 147-151.
74. The timing of the referendum coincided with oral argument before the Euro-
pean Court in the Johnston case. This left the Irish Government in the anomalous
position of arguing before the court on Monday that the constitutional ban on
divorce did not violate human rights and on Thursday, urging the electorate to vote
for the constitutional amendment allowing divorce. Irish Times, June 23, 1986, at 8,
col. 4.
75. Proposed tenth amendment to the Irish constitution, reprinted in Irish Times,
June 26, 1986, at 8, col. 4. The proposed amendment replaced the existing section
41.3.2 with the following text:
Where, and only where, such court established under this Constitution as
may be prescribed by law is satisfied that-
I. a marriage has failed,
II. the failure has continued for a period of, or periods amounting to, at
least five years,
III. there is no reasonable possibility of reconciliation between the parties
to the marriage, and
IV. any other condition prescribed by law has been complied with,
the court may in accordance with law grant a dissolution of the marriage pro-
vided that the court is satisfied that adequate and proper provision having
regard to the circumstances will be made for any dependent spouse and for
any child of or any child who is dependent on either spouse.
Id.
76. Id.
77. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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with responsibility for the unexpectedly high negative vote.8 2 Many saw
the church's involvement as indicative of the great division in opinion on
the nature of Irish society.8 3 John Cooney, a political correspondent to
the Irish Tinws, commented that "[t]he [divorce] campaign has.., again
highlighted the differences in outlook between those attached to tradi-
tional Catholic values and those aspiring to a more pluralist society that
does not insist on the maintenance of the Catholic ethos and teaching in
the Constitution." 8 4 The predominantly Catholic population of Ireland
had to make this choice in the face of a strong Church opposition to
divorce.
b. North and South: Is Divorce Necessary for a United Ireland?
Closely related to the church and state issue but with an added political
dimension was the debate concerning the effect of the referendum on
future relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic to the
south. Hopes for a united republic waned because the laws of Northern
Ireland allow divorce, arguably maintaining a barrier between the two
nations on this important social and religious issue. As moderates in the
North urged support for the referendum,8 5 an editorial in the Befist Tel-
egraph predicted that a vote against divorce would "severely dent" Prime
Minister FitzGerald's vision of a reunited Ireland.8 6 Members of Fitz-
Gerald's political party, Fine Gael, also feared greater separation
between North and South if the referendum failed.8 7
82. Menendez, supra note 70, at 175 ("the major factor for the unexpectedly
heavy negative vote was the role of the Roman Catholic Church as arbiter of con-
science of all but a handful of Irish voices."). See also Dr. Jeremiah Newman, Bishop
of Limerick, God Says "No" to Divorce, Irish Times, June 23, 1986, at 1, col. 2. Dr.
Keven McNamera, the Archbishop of Dublin also expressed the Church's "emphatic
opposition" to the referendum, saying divorce would hinder people "in their efforts
to live in union with God in this life and in the next." Irish Times, June 23, 1986, at
1, col. 2.
83. The Irish Labour Party faulted the church hierarchy for intimidating
Catholics to vote against the referendum, stating: "How much better it would have
been if the two bishops felt able to rely on the commitment of their people-a com-
mitment that has seen them and the Church through much-rather than on fear."
Irish Times, June 23, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
84. Cooney, Referendum Plea by Taoiseach on Minority Rights, Irish Times, June 26,
1986, at 1, col. 4.
85. Irish Times, June 26, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
86. Belfast Telegraph, reprinted in Irish Times, June 26, 1986, at 1, col. 7.
87. Four members of Fine Gael predicted that without passage of the tenth
amendment, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic "would assume
the severity of a Berlin Wall-'separating the troubled North from what will be seen
as a partitionist, inward-looking and smug State dominated by the views of one
Church.'" Irish Times, June 26, 1986, at 8, col. 7.
When the referendum vote was tallied, those in Northern Ireland supporting union
with Great Britain hailed the negative result as evidence of partitionist thinking. The
Unionist party leader declared, "The referendum result shows . . . Maynooth [the
leading Catholic seminary in Ireland] rather than the Dail still rules. The Roman
Catholic Church rules supreme over a subservient State and people." Irish Times,
June 28, 1986, at 9, col. 1. John Hume, the moderate Catholic leader in Northern
Ireland, sadly expressed similar thoughts: "Why would Protestants in Northern Ire-
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c. Effects of Divorce: Hardship for Women and Children?
Opponents of the referendum also argued that divorce in Ireland would
cause tremendous hardship among divorced women and their children.
One group claimed that divorce would impoverish wives, eventually
leading to compulsory adoption of their children.8 8 In response, refer-
endum supporters argued that the rising level of marital breakdown in
Ireland was the primary source of hardship for spouses and children and
that legalizing the status of the deserted would ameliorate their condi-
tion.8 9 Deserted wives would have the constitutional right to adequate
maintenance from their spouses for the first time,90 and children might
avoid the stress associated with an unhappy marriage.9 ' In short, sup-
porters of the referendum contended that the arguments against divorce
were misplaced, exaggerated, and played unreasonably on people's
fears. 92
d. Compassion for Broken Marriages
For many Irish, the critical element in the referendum debate was com-
passion. Supporters cast the victims of marital breakdown in a humani-
tarian light. They argued that marital dissolution was the exception to
the institution of marriage, and its victims deserve understanding. "Put
compassion in the Constitution" was the slogan urging many to support
divorce.9 3 Proponents supported divorce not as a solution to marital
problems, but as "a means of easing the pain, of ensuring that people
whose marriages have broken down are not condemned to lives of mis-
ery without a second chance." '9 4
land," he asked, "be expected to welcome a united Ireland someday if the Republic
to the South votes in an election on the word of the Pope?" quoted in Menendez, supra
note 70, at 176.
88. Irish Times, June 23, 1986, at 8, col. 5 (statement of the Family Rights
Council).
89. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
90. Irish Times,June 21, 1986, at 8, col. 3 (statement of Solicitor Brenda Allen of
the Fine Gael Women's Group).
91. The Irish Association of Labour Teachers stated that teachers who had
observed the signs of marital failure in their students agreed that the "situation
improved dramatically when the separation took place." Irish Times,June 21, 1986,
at 8, col. 1. The Association hoped that allowing divorce would permit the separa-
tion to take place with "less rancor, tension ... trauma... and even violence." Id.
92. Solicitor Brenda Allen of the Fine Gael Women's Group characterized the
anti-divorce campaign as "feeding on this vulnerability [of women concerned for
their children's well being] like vultures." Irish Times, June 21, 1986, at 8, col. 4.
93. Irish Times, June 26, 1986, at 8, col. 3.
94. Walsh, One more challengefor the Republic, Irish Times, June 26, 1986, at 10, col.
1. The Irish Times, Dublin's leading newspaper, supported the referendum for largely
the same reason. A voting-day editorial urged the public to take "an unparalleled
opportunity to be generous, to vote for people who are in trouble. The issue of
divorce should not be looked at in terms of possible, hypothetical dangers in the
future ... but in terms of the many who are in marital straits." Id. at 11, col. 1.
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2. Referendum Results
On June 26, 1986, over 60% of the eligible voters cast their ballots, 9 5
resulting in a two-to-one margin against the referendum. Over 60% of
the participating electorate voted "no" to divorce in Ireland. 96
H. The European Convention on Human Rights
A. Origin
With little opportunity to obtain a valid divorce through domestic chan-
nels, some Irish citizens have looked to international tribunals for relief.
Applicant Roy Johnston in Johnston v. Ireland looked to the European
Court on Human Rights for protection under the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 9 7 This
Part will examine the nature of rights guaranteed in the Convention and
the protection machinery the Convention offers.
In the wake of the second world war, the newly formed Council of
Europe sought to achieve a closer unity between its members for the
purpose of "safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which
are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social
progress." 9 8 European nations pursued this goal through the drafting
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms. 9 9 In the Convention, members of the Council reaffirmed "their
profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the founda-
tion of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the
one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a com-
mon understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon which
they depend."' 0 0 Member nations signed it in 1950, and it took effect in
1953.101
B. Jurisdiction and Enforcement
To date, all twenty-one member states of the Council of Europe have
95. Actual turnout was 62.7%. Id.,June 28, 1986, at 1, col. 2. Polls taken before
the vote by the Irish Times, the nation's largest newspaper, had shown 52% of the
population in favor of the amendment and 77% in favor of divorce under some cir-
cumstances. Another poll taken a week before the vote showed the margin slipping.
Irish Times/Market Research Bureau of Ireland Survey, Irish Times, February 10, 1986.
Id.,June 25, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
96. Irish Times, June 28, 1986, at 1, col. 2 (538,279-yes; 935,844-no).
97. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
98. Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 1 (a), reprinted in MANUAL OF THE COUN-
CIL OF EUROPE 299 (1970).
99. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights).
100. Id. preamble.
101. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948), cited in European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99
(preamble).
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ratified the Convention, 10 2 thus submitting themselves to its jurisdic-
tion. While some nations selectively adopted only parts of the Conven-
tion and its more recent protocols, 10 3 Ireland has ratified the entire
Convention.
In addition to setting forth substantive legal provisions, the Con-
vention includes the procedural machinery necessary to enforce funda-
mental freedoms.1 0 4 Both national governments and individuals may
file complaints of alleged violations of the Convention 10 5 with the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights. After the Commission writes its
report, it may refer the case to the European Court of Human Rights for
further review. 10 6 In addition, a nation-party may appeal directly to the
European Court of Human Rights. 10 7 Individuals have no right to a
mandatory appeal before the Court.' 0 8 If neither the Commission nor
the nation-party refers the case to the European Court, the Committee
of Ministers for the Council of Europe issues a report on whether the
defendant violated the Convention. 109 The Committee of Ministers, an
organ of the Council of Europe, is responsible for enforcing judgments
of the European Court.1 10 In Johnston v. Ireland, Roy Johnston com-
plained first to the Commission, which issued a decision against John-
ston, but referred the case to the court, where Johnston again lost."I'
Although all parties to the Convention "undertake to abide by the
decision of the court in any case to which they are a party,"' 12 they vary
in the force that they grant the Convention in their respective domestic
legal systems. While some nations place the Convention on a legal level
102. Nations which have ratified the Convention include: Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom. STOcK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A PERIODIc NOTE ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Sec. to the Eur. Comm'n H.R., Council of Europe (1984). For an
overview of Convention structure, see generally Sands, Boston College International and
Comparative Law Review European Law: First Issue, 10 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1, 4-8
(1987).
103. See Sands, supra note 102, at 5 n.36, for citation to the eight protocols.
104. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99. The enforcement
machinery of the Convention sets it apart from other human rights agreements such
as the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 101.
105. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, arts. 24 and 25. Arti-
cle 25 of the Convention permits individuals to bring complaints if their country has
approved the article. Ireland has submitted itself to the entire Convention. EURO-
PEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 54 (Directorate of Information, Strasbourg,
1968).
106. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, arts. 32, 48.
107. Id.
108. R. BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE 43 (1980).
109. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, art. 31.
110. Id.
111. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
112. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, art. 53.
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equal to their own constitutions, l"1 others, notably Ireland, have not
incorporated the Convention into domestic law and refuse to adjudicate
issues raised under it in their domestic courts. 1 4 Thus, in some coun-
tries, one may challenge alleged human rights violations in domestic
courts on the grounds that such action violates the European Conven-
tion, while in Ireland, this course is unavailable. Irish citizens must pro-
ceed directly to the European Commission and Court in Strasbourg.
C. Rights Protected
Foremost among the rights the Convention protects is the right to life
and liberty. 1 5 One could view the other provisions as subordinate
expressions of the basic respect for life. The Convention also guaran-
tees the following rights: prohibition of torture or inhuman treat-
ment;"16 prohibition of slavery or forced labor;" 7 fair public hearings
by an independent tribunal to determine civil claims and criminal
charges; 1 8 prohibition of retroactive criminal convictions; 1 19 respect
for family and private life;' 20 freedom of religion, thought, and con-
science;' 21 freedom of expression;122 freedom of assembly and associa-
tion;123 freedom to marry and found a family; 12 4 and freedom to enjoy
protected rights without discrimination.' 2 5
Johnston involved alleged violations of the provisions regarding mar-
riage, family, and the right to religious freedom and equal treatment.
The debate in Johnston focused on article 12 of the Convention which
provides: "Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry
and to found a family according to the national laws governing the exer-
113. Austria and the Netherlands are two nations. Sundberg, The European Experi-
ence of Human Rights Proceedings: The Precedent Value of the European Court's Decisions, 20
AKRON L. REV. 629, 644 (1987).
114. E. v. E., (Ir. H. Ct., May 7, 1982) (unreported), cited in Whyte, The Application of
the European Convention of Human Rights Before the Irish Courts, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
856, 857 (1982). In this case the Irish High Court found no cause of action for plain-
tiff challenging domestic legal aid provisions on the theory that it violated the Con-
vention as interpreted in Airey v. Ireland. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying
text. The court ruled that since the Convention was not part of domestic law, dis-
putes concerning it could not be adjudicated in Irish courts. Instead, the court
instructed the plaintiff to seek relief in the European Commission and Court, a pro-
cess that would likely require several more years. Id. The court cited art. 29, § 6 of
the Irish Constitution which states: "No international agreement shall be part of the
domestic law of the state save as may be determined by the Oireachtas." Id.
115. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, arts. 2, 5.
116. Id. art. 3.
117. Id. art. 4.
118. Id. art. 6.
119. Id. art. 7.
120. Id. art. 8.
121. Id. art. 9.
122. Id. art. 10.
123. Id. art. 11.
124. Id. art. 12.
125. Id. art. 14.
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cise of this right."' 2 6
Also at issue in Johnston was article 8 of the Convention which states
that "[e]veryone has ... [the] right to respect for his private and family
life .... There shall be no interference... with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security."' 12 7 Johnston also
challenged Ireland's divorce ban on the grounds that it violated his reli-
gious freedom as guaranteed by article 9 and that Ireland discriminated
against his non-marital family in violation of article 14.128
D. Judicial Interpretation of the Convention Articles at Issue
Since the Convention's implementation in 1953, both the Commission
and the Court of Human Rights have applied and interpreted the vari-
ous Convention provisions in their decisions. The two tribunals' deci-
sions have often broadened the protection of individual human rights
under the Convention. 129
In Marckx v. Belgium, 13 the European Court of Human Rights
decided that a Belgian statute that differentiated between the succession
rights of legitimate and illegitimate children' 3 1 violated the Conven-
tion. 132 The statute was in place in 1950 when Belgium signed the Con-
vention. It is likely that Belgium would have objected to forced equality
had the original draft demanded it. 133 Nevertheless the court held that
the statute had to be changed to provide equal treatment for children
within and outside the marital family. 134 The court wrote that the Con-
vention must be interpreted in "light of present-day conditions," rather
than by an inflexible reading of the original text. 13 5
The significance of Marckx lies in the court's showing its willingness
to interpret the Convention broadly. In Marckx, the court struck down a
126. Id. art. 12.
127. Id. art. 8.
128. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at paras. 59-61.
129. McRedmond, Divorce: The Irish Constitution and the European Convention, 84/85
LAW &JusT. 14 (1985).
130. 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
131. Id. at para. 14.
132. Id. at paras. 42-47. The Court found violations of articles 8 and 14 with
respect to both mother and daughter applicants. Id. at para. 48.
133. The Court wrote, "It is true that, at the time when the Convention ... was
drafted, it was regarded as permissible and normal in many European countries to
draw a distinction in this area between the 'illegitimate' and the 'legitimate' family."
Id. at para. 41.
134. Id. at para. 45.
135. Id. at para. 41. "[The Court cannot but be struck by the fact that the domes-
tic law of the great majority of the member States of the Council of Europe has
evolved and is continuing to evolve, in company with the relevant international
instruments, towards full juridical recognition of the maxim 'mater semoer certa est'."
Id. The court affirmed this position in Airey v. Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979):
"[t]he convention must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions ... and it
is designed to safeguard the individual in a real and practical way .... Id. at para.
26.
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law that was permissible in many of the signatory countries in 1950,
when the Convention was signed.' 3 6 Knowing that Belgium did not
intend to include equality for illegitimate children in the Convention did
not deter the court from expanding the rights protected beyond what
was expressly included or intended in the Convention.13 7
The court found in Airey v. Ireland 13 3 that the Convention may cre-
ate positive obligations for member states in order to protect the human
rights the Convention guarantees.13 9 In Airey, the complainant sought
release from her allegedly violent, alcoholic husband through a court-
ordered separation.' 40 Mrs. Airey was unable to meet the legal costs of
the separation procedure and demanded that Ireland provide free legal
services. 14 1 She argued that the absence of an effective, accessible rem-
edy for marital breakdown violated her Article 8 rights to respect for
family life. 14 2 The court agreed, holding that "protection of family life
may sometimes necessitate [a married couple] being relieved from the
duty to live together."' 143 The interplay of these cases and Johnston will
be more fully developed in Part IV. 14 4
IMl. Johnston v. Ireland
A. Facts
In 1952, Roy Johnston, the "first applicant," married in a Church of
Ireland ceremony. ' 4 5 After thirteen years of marriage, during which he
and his wife had three children, "it became clear ... that the marriage
had irretrievably broken down."' 4 6 He and his wife separated. In 1971,
Johnston moved in with the "second applicant," Janice Williams-John-
ston. Seven years later, they had a child, Nessa Williams-Johnston, the
"third applicant". As discussed above, the Irish constitution prohibited
Johnston from either divorcing his first wife or marrying Williams-John-
ston. The separation agreement Johnston and his wife signed legally
divided their property and provided thatJohnston would financially sup-
136. Marckx, at para. 41.
137. See supra note 135.
138. 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
139. See Thornberry, Poverty, Litigation and Fundamental Rights, 29 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q 250, 254 (1980).
140. Airey v. Ireland. 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979), at para. 8.
141. Id. at para. 15.
142. Id. at para. 32 ("[T]he court does not consider that Ireland can be said to
have 'interfered' with Mrs. Airey's private or family life: the substance of her com-
plaint is not that the state has acted but that it has failed to act... [article 8] does not
merely compel the state to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primar-
ily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective
respect for private or family life.").
143. Id. at para. 33.
144. See infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
145. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 11. The
Church of Ireland is a Protestant denomination which, unlike the Roman Catholic
Church, does not oppose divorce in all circumstances.
146. Id.
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port his wife and children. It did not and could not allow Johnston or
his wife to remarry. 14 7 While Johnston and Janice Williams-Johnston
primarily sought the opportunity to marry, they also complained of their
inferior legal status and that of their daughter.
14 8
B. European Commission on Human Rights Decision
In the first hearing of the case, the European Commission on Human
Rights found against Johnston's and Janice Williams-Johnston's claims
of entitlement to divorce and discrimination under Irish law. The Com-
mission found, however, that Ireland had breached article 8 by failing to
respect the family life of all three applicants with regard to the child,
Nessa. 149 The Commission affirmed the basic premise of Marckx that
the Convention is a "living instrument." That the Irish constitution pre-
dated the convention was irrelevant. 150 In doing so, the Commission
reaffirmed its power to adapt the Convention to current concerns and to
reserve to itself the power of judicial review over the signatory state's
law.
Nevertheless, the Commission limited its decision to the plain lan-
guage of the Convention. It would not "include within the convention
matters which have been explicitly and deliberately excluded from its
ambit."1 5 1 Specifically, the Commission held that the right to marry
guaranteed by article 12 did not provide the right to divorce and subse-
quent remarriage. 15 2 As support for this position, the Commission cited
the travauxpreparatoires, the record of deliberations during the drafting of
the Convention,' 5 3 for the proposition that the drafters intentionally
omitted the right to divorce.1
54
C. European Court of Human Rights Decision
After hearing Johnston's appeal, the European Court of Human Rights
affirmed the Commission's decision by a vote of sixteen to one. 155 In a
lengthy opinion, the court considered and rejected each of the com-
plainants' arguments. While acknowledging its previous decisions sup-
porting the applicants' position, the court declined to extend the
principles of Marckx and Airey to Johnston's situation.
147. Id. at para. 12; See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
148. See State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtala, 1966 I.R. 567, 590. See supra notes
28-29 and accompanying text.
149. Johnston v. Ireland, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Applic. No. 9697/82, para. 154
(1985).
150. Id. at para. 100.
151. Id. at para. 101.
152. Id. at para. 103.
153. Id. at para. 96; see Collected Edition of the "Travaux Preparatoires" (1975)
[hereinafter travaux preparatoires].
154. The drafters generally followed the United Nations's Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which does call for the right to divorce. With little explanation, the
Convention drafters consciously omitted it from what became article 12. Travaux
preparatoires, supra note 153, at 168, 194 (vol. 1).
155. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
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1. Article 12: The Right to Marry
Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that
"[m]en and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to
found a family."' 1 5 6 The applicants did not argue that the Convention
guaranteed a per se right to divorce, but rather that the divorce prohibi-
tion under Irish law deprived them of their right to marry under article
12.157 The court considered the right to remarry and the inability to
divorce so intertwined in this case that they could not be analyzed sepa-
rately. 158 Hence, the issue for the court was whether the right to marry
and the right to divorce could be derived from article 12.
In considering "the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
this provision in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose,"' 1 59 the court determined there was no right to divorce under arti-
cle 12. First, the court deferred to Irish law, refusing to find that "in a
society adhering to the principle of monogamy, such a restriction can be
regarded as injuring the substance of the right guaranteed by article
12." 160 Second, the court noted, as the Commission had, that in the
travaux preparatoires, the Convention drafters notably deleted words per-
taining to marriage dissolution from the U.N. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 1 6 1 Third, while acknowledging that the "Convention
and its Protocols must be interpreted in the light of present-day condi-
tions," 16 2 the court, citing Marckx, found it could not "derive from these
instruments a right that was not included therein at the outset."16 3
2. Article 8: Respect for Family Life
The court also rejected the applicants' arguments based on Article 8,
which provides that "[e]veryone has the right to respect of his private
and family life."'16 4 The court noted that article 8 "applies to the 'Fam-
ily life' of the 'illegitimate' family as well as to that of the 'legitimate'
family" and that it may impose "positive obligations inherent in an effec-
tive 'respect' for family life."' 6 5 While the court found the Williams-
Johnstons to be a family, it concluded that the contours of "effective
156. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, art. 12.
157. The applicants' argument here is problematic. It seems to suggest that only a
separated person with another potential mate should have the right to divorce so he
or she can remarry.
158. The court held, "The second applicant is not complaining of a general inabil-
ity to marry but the inability to marry the first applicant. This situation stems directly
from his inability to obtain a divorce. Consequently the case cannot be examined in
isolation from the problem of non-availability of divorce." Johnston v. Ireland, 112
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 50.
159. Id. at para. 51.
160. Id. at para. 52.
161. Id. See travaux preparatoires, supra note 153, at 268 (vol. 1).
162. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 53.
163. Id.
164. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, art. 8.
165. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 55.
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respect," must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 16 6 Despite find-
ing that Ireland had violated the family's article 8 rights, the court
declined to grant relief in the form of divorce. The court's rationale was
that the more specific article 12 did not include the right.
3. Article 9: Freedom of Religion and Conscience
The court rejected Johnston's argument that the Irish ban on divorce
violated his freedom of conscience and religion. With little discussion,
the court simply found that "Article 9 cannot, in its ordinary meaning,
be taken to extend" to divorce. 167 The court failed to discuss possible
religious conflicts between Ireland as a predominantly Catholic state
and the applicants as a religious minority.' 6 8
4. Article 14: Right to be Free from Discrimination
Article 14 provides that the "enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination."' 169
The applicants argued that the ban on divorce discriminated on the
basis of financial status, as more wealthy persons were better able to
obtain a foreign divorce.' 7 0 Nevertheless, the court found that the Irish
statutes pertaining to foreign divorce were imposed equally on all
citizens. 17 1
5. Finding for Nessa, the Child
Despite its decision against the first and second applicants, the court
found in favor of the Williams-Johnstons' daughter, Nessa. Citing the
legal impediments to an illegitimate child leading a normal family life,
the court found that Irish law violated the article 8 guarantee of her
right to respect of her family life. 17 2 The court stressed that Marckx
implied "an obligation for the State to act in a manner calculated to
allow these family ties to develop normally."'17 3 The court directed Ire-
land to equalize legal treatment of all children.
IV. Analysis
A. Allowing Divorce for the Child's Sake
By contributing to the incidents of illegitimacy that produce both social
166. Id.
167. Id. at para. 63.
168. Though Roy Johnston was raised in the Protestant Church of Ireland, he,
Janice Williams-Johnston, and their daughter Nessa now belong to the Society of
Friends, or Quakers. Id. at para. 15.
The court failed to rule on other legal disabilities unmarried couples suffer in Ire-
land, stating that such difficulties were not at issue in the case. Id. at para. 65.
169. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99.
170. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 59.
171. Id.
172. Id. at paras. 75-76.
173. Id. at para. 74.
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and legal disabilities for children like Nessa, 174 the Irish divorce ban
undercuts the state's expressed goal of supporting family life.175 The
court acknowledged that the ban harmed Nessa17 6 socially, and that
Nessa's illegitimate status caused by the prohibition on her parent's
right to marry stigmatized her. Legally, she faces substantial barriers to
inheritance from her parents, benefits of social welfare programs, and
tax treatment equal to that of other Irish citizens. Moreover, even
though the potential harm to Nessa stems from her illegitimate status, a
situation over which she had no control, current Irish law leaves her
without a remedy. 177
Because of their unique vulnerabilities, children historically have
been singled out to receive special protective treatment under the
law.' 7 8 Psychologists, 179 attorneys,' 8 0 and international political legal
bodies' 8 ' have acknowledged this by stressing that the "best interests of
the child" must be "the paramount consideration"' 18 2 in any legal con-
text affecting children. Where a child is involved in a legal dispute, her
interests should generally come before the adult interests or possibly
before larger societal goals I8 3 because of her special needs. Moreover,
174. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
175. The United States Supreme Court has struck down statutes that discriminate
based on illegitimacy. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1971):
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condem-
nation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting
this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover,
imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrong-doing.
Id.
176. Id.
177. Since Nessa's parents may not marry, it is impossible for her to be legiti-
mated. Nessa's parents cannot adopt her since they are unmarried. Adoption Act,
No. 25 (1952).
The European Court noted that there are no "means available to [Nessa] or her
parents to eliminate or reduce the differences [between legitimate and illegitimate
children]." Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 75.
178. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 3 (1979) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SoLNrr]. This work focuses on the
psychological interests of the child, particularly in custody contests. However, the
authors' emphasis on the primacy of the child's interest in guiding decisions affecting
children is useful in analyzingJohnston.
On an international level, the United Nations has been active in enacting instru-
ments upholding the special position of children and urging their protection. See
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Res. 1386 (XIV), Nov. 20, 1959 [hereinafter
U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child]. Principle 8 provides that "the child
shall in all circumstances be among the first to receive protection and relief." Id.
179. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNrr, supra note 178, at 7.
180. Id.
181. See U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 178.
182. Id. at principle 2.
183. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). The United States Supreme
Court struck down an Illinois statute that discriminated against illegitimate children
in rights of succession. The court found the state's purpose in encouraging family
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by pursuing the best interests of the child, society will benefit in the long
run. Experts stress that in caring for the child, "society stands to gain a
person capable of becoming an adequate parent for children of the
future." 18 4
Allowing divorce and subsequent remarriage in Ireland would serve
the best interests of the illegitimate child. Nessa would have benefitted
from her parents marrying in three ways. First, she would no longer be
illegitimate in the eyes of the law and so would have gained greater con-
stitutional and statutory protection.' 8 5 Second, she would have avoided
the social stigma of illegitimacy. Finally, she would have been free to
develop the natural bonds of normal family life that the court concedes
are vital to both an individual and society.18 6 By impeding the right to
divorce and remarry, Ireland undermines the very familial ties it strives
to protect.
The relief the European Court granted Nessa, requiring Ireland to
equalize legal treatment of all children, is inadequate. It fails to elimi-
nate the label and hence the social stigma of illegitimacy. It also fails to
consider that in refusing to allow divorce and subsequent marriage, the
court prevents illegitimate children from enjoying a normal family life.
The court conceded that the Irish legal system treats illegitimate chil-
dren unequally and victimizes unmarried parents. 18 7 The court went on
to hold that Irish law, which fails to respect family life, violates the arti-
cle 8 rights of all three applicants. Nevertheless, the court failed to find
that this violation would be best avoided by allowing divorce.18 8 Simply
allowing divorce for irreparably broken marriage would permit subse-
quent marriages. These subsequent marriages are in the best interest of
illegitimate and future children.
relationships and developing efficient estate settlement did not justify discriminating
against illegitimate children.
United States courts today minimize differences in legal treatment of legitimate
and illegitimate children, with some states legitimating all children. See, e.g., Or. Rev.
Stat., § 109.060 (1975). R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAw 213-14 (1987).
184. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 178, at 7.
185. See supra notes 30-35, 40, 43 and accompanying text.
186. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 74. The court
noted that "'respect' for family life, understood as including the ties between near
relatives, implies an obligation for the State to act in a manner calculated to allow
these ties to develop normally." Id.
187. Id. at paras. 42, 46, 65. "The applicants are.., entitled.., to claim to be
victims of the breaches which they allege." Id. at para. 42. "Moreover, the close and
intimate relationship between [Nessa] and her parents is such that there is of neces-
sity also a resultant failure to respect the family life of each of the latter." Id. at para.
75.
188. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 75.
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B. Interpreting or Amending the Convention to Allow Divorce and
Protect the Non-Marital Family
1. Article 12 Implies a Right to Divorce and Remarry
The language of article 12 guarantees that "men and women of mar-
riageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to
the national laws governing the exercise of this right."' 18 9 RoyJohnston
claimed that the Irish divorce ban interfered with his right to remarry.
While the divorce ban did not directly addressJanice Williams-Johnston,
since she was not married, it indirectly prohibited her from marrying the
person she considered her husband and who was the father of her child.
In order for Williams-Johnston to freely exercise her right to marry,
Johnston must be permitted to remarry.' 9 0
In interpreting article 12, the court emphasized the omission of any
express provision for divorce in the Convention, as noted in the travaux
preparatoires of the Convention. 19 ' This reliance on the travaux is mis-
placed. The travaux, which were not published until twenty-five years
after the signing of the Convention, were to be considered as a collec-
tion of reports on the drafting process, not as a definitive interpretation
of the Convention. 19 2 While the travaux may be useful and informative
in discerning the historical development of the Convention, they should
not be the determinative basis for a straightjacket on judicial interpreta-
tion. The court overly relied upon the travaux in interpreting article 12.
Significantly, neither the travaux nor the court gives any substantive rea-
son why there should be no right to divorce and remarriage. In light of
the substantive agreements favoring divorce, the court should be more
open to alternative interpretations of the Convention.
In addition, the case law interpreting the Convention supports a
broad interpretation of the right to marry. In Marckx v. Belgium, 19 3 dis-
cussed above, the court applied the Convention "in light of current con-
ditions," even though the new interpretation conflicted with the original
intent of the Convention signatories. Marckx should govern Johnston
because of their factual and legal similarities. Both cases deal with the
right to found and enjoy a family, Marckx for mother and child,Johnston
for a non-marital family. 194 Indeed the court conceded in Johnston that
189. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, art. 12.
190. Although the purpose of article 12 is unclear from the travaux preparatoires,
supra note 153, arguably in modern Western European society the right to marry
includes the freedom to choose one's spouse in order to build a more fruitful life.
191. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1986), at para. 52.
192. See travauxpreparatoires, supra note 153 (introduction by A.H. Robertson, noted
scholar on the European Convention on Human Rights).
193. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
194. Admittedly, there are distinctions between Marckx and Johnston. Marckx deals
primarily with the statutory rights of illegitimate children. Johnston mainly addresses
parents' rights to divorce and remarriage. Arguably, Marckx is properly limited to the
question of the rights of illegitimate children. In Marckx, the court also had only to
order Belgium to amend a statute, not its constitution. Presumably, the latter
demands a greater mandate to amend it. Nevertheless, these distinctions do not pro-
hibit applying the rationale of Marckx to Johnston. Reasoning by analogy is an
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Marckx governed with regard to the finding for Nessa. t9 5 While in both
cases the court could have reasoned that the nontraditional family was
not protected under the text of the Convention only in Johnston did the
Court emphasize the intent of the drafters. Even if the drafters had not
originally intended to protect divorce under the Convention, the John-
ston court, relying on Marckx, should have found for the applicants.
Instead, the court took a rigid approach unsupported by normative rea-
soning or compelling precedent.
2. Article 8
Both the court and the Commission narrowly interpreted the article 8
right to family privacy. The Johnston court concluded that article 8
applied to the Williams-Johnstons, despite their non-marital status.
They had lived together for fifteen years, and the court concluded that
they were a family "notwithstanding the fact that their relationship exists
outside marriage."' 96 The court had already found that the right to
respect for family life demanded that member states make the means for
achieving judicial separation accessible to married couples.' 9 7 In Airey
v. Ireland,19 8 the court found that in order to protect family life the state
must sometimes allow a couple relief from the duty to live together.
Moreover, it required Ireland to provide free legal services for obtaining
a legal separation.' 9 9 In doing so, it broadened the meaning of respect
for the family, as protected by the Convention. The Johnston court could
have followed this evolving interpretation of article 8, finding a right to
divorce. 20 0 Instead, the court held that article 12 controlled by virtue of
its more specific terms and hence denied relief.20 1
There are several flaws in the Johnston court's approach to article 8.
First, the court gave no strong reason for failing to follow the evolving
interpretation in order to fulfill the Convention's promise to protect
human rights. Faced with a sympathetic situation and a history of grant-
ing relief to applicants claiming disadvantage,20 2 the court should have
accepted practice in law generally and within the European Court's decisions. The
language of Marckx shows that the Court intended the case to hold significance
beyond its narrow factual context. Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979),
at para. 58. The distinction between statutes and constitutions also fails to limit
Marckx's application. Nothing in Marckx suggests the Court was reluctant to order a
member nation to amend its constitution. Moreover, in Johnston, the court explicitly
found the Irish constitution violated Nessa Williams-Johnston's article 8 rights. John-
ston, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
195. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 72.
196. Id. at para. 56.
197. Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1979), at para. 33.
198. 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1979).
199. Id. at para. 81.
200. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 57.
201. Id. at paras. 57-58.
202. The Court has a recent history of granting relief in empirically sympathetic
situations. At least one commentator has noted the significance of circumstances in
European Court litigation. McRedmond, Divorce: The Irish Constitution and the Euro-
pean Convention, 84/85 LAW &JusT. 14, 15 (1985). Certainly the applicants in Johnston
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to provide support for its decision to deny relief to the Williams-John-
stons. Based on article 8, the court held that with respect to Nessa, Ire-
land violated the family rights of all three applicants. 203 Yet the court
made a forced distinction between the right to family life for children
and the right of the parents to marry in order to improve family life for
themselves and their children. The court gives no reason why this dis-
tinction is appropriate. 2 04
3. Freedom to Divorce Based on Article 9 Freedom of Religion
Though the Court brushed aside the applicants' religious freedom argu-
ment,20 5 it seems central to the case. The applicants in Johnston were
members of the Society of Friends, or Quaker religion, which did not
prohibit them from divorcing or remarrying. 20 6 The issue of religious
freedom is particularly important in this case since the Irish ban on
divorce is rooted in strong sectarian influences in Irish law.20 7
From its beginning as an independent state, the Republic of Ireland
has been fueled by Catholic nationalism. 20 8 The contemporary consti-
tution which bars divorce was adopted in 1937, after attempts to unite
the Protestant North and Catholic South had failed. 20 9 The language of
the constitution reflects its Catholic backing.2 10 Today the Catholic
hierarchy continues to be involved heavily in Irish politics, recently
influencing the defeat of the divorce referendum.2 1 ' Clearly the bar to
divorce is largely a religious matter.2 12
Popular support for a law banning divorce also fails to justify the
court's decision. First, the overwhelming Catholic majority in Ireland-
nearly 95% of the population-tends to limit religious diversity and tol-
erance. The practical difficulty for a religious minority to overcome the
anti-divorce provision is nearly insurmountable. Second, it is norma-
tively undesirable to justify the divorce ban on democratic principles
since the ban simply furthers tyranny of the majority. As Judge de
Meyer pointed out in his dissent in Johnston, a democratic society
fit this condition. At the time of the Court decision,Johnston and Williams-Johnston
had lived together for fifteen years. Yet neither they nor their child were able to form
the type of family-the marital family-protected by Irish law. They suffered legal
disabilities and social stigma, yet the Court uncharacteristically found against them.
203. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at paras. 74-75.
204. See supra notes 172-73, 187-88 and accompanying text.
205. See Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 63. The
court declined to view the Irish ban on divorce as a religious issue. Instead they saw
it as a matter of civil law.
206. See id. at para. 60.
207. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
212. Even on religious terms, the Irish system is more rigid than the canon law of
the Catholic church. See McRedmond, The Constitution of Ireland and the Declaration on
Religious Freedom, 70/71 LAw &JusT. 71 (1981).
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demands "pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. ' '2 13 The court
itself supported this proposition in earlier cases.21 4 In Young, James and
Webster v. U.K 2 15 the court wrote that "although individual interests
must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does
not simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a bal-
ance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of
minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position. ' 2 16 Popular
support for prohibiting divorce fails to answer the practical and norma-
tive concerns of the aggrieved religious minority and hence fails to jus-
tify what Judge de Meyer calls "so draconian a system." '2 17
C. Ramifications of a Decision in Johnston's Favor
Since the Johnston court found no right to divorce despite the strong nor-
mative arguments and sufficient precedent to find such a right, it is rea-
sonable to ask what other factors played a role in the court's decision.
Arguably, the court in Johnston tacitly recognized its limited ability to
order fundamental changes in Irish society.
Johnston calls into question the effectiveness of the Convention on
Human Rights and its enforcement bodies. While many nations have
followed the court's decisions, often enacting reform legislation or even
constitutional amendments, Ireland has not honored court decisions to
the same extent.2 18 The court ultimately has little power to enforce its
decisions; its final recourse is expulsion from the Council of Europe. 2 19
The court relies heavily on the voluntary compliance of member states.
It is questionable, if not doubtful, that Ireland would have complied if
the court found in favor of divorce.
Some issues may be too politically volatile for the court to decide.
Certainly there is a point beyond which a member state will not accept
the Court of Human Rights rulings. Perhaps the court feared it would
pass this point by ordering divorce in a 95% Catholic country that had
resoundingly defeated a recent divorce referendum.
It is difficult to predict how Ireland would have reacted if theJohn-
ston Court had found a right to divorce. On one side, Ireland would
213. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 5 (de Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
214. See Handyside v. U.K., 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976), at para. 49; Lingens v.
Austria, 8 EHRR 329, para. 41; Young, James and Webster v. U.K., 4 EHRR 38, para.
63.
215. 4 EHRR 38.
216. Id. at para. 63, cited in Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986),
at para. 5 (de Meyer, J., dissenting).
217. Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), at para. 5 (de Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
218. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
219. R. BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE 46 (1980). Ireland has already
shown reluctance to enforce decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. In
E. v. E., a domestic Irish case, the plaintiff sought free legal services under the Euro-
pean Court's Airey decision. The Irish court refused and instructed the plaintiff to go
back to Human Rights Court for relief. Supra note 114.
Vol. 22
1989 Divorce & The European Convention
have to consider the value of upholding international agreements and its
place in the Council of Europe.220 On the other side, it would have to
weigh the value of the predominantly Catholic "Irish way of life" 221 that
has fueled the national identity for sixty years. Several factors suggest
that legalizing divorce would be politically difficult for any Irish govern-
ment. The Prime Minister of Ireland in 1986, Garret FitzGerald, came
into power backing a "constitutional crusade," 222 that sought to elimi-
nate religious and political barriers to a united Ireland. 223 The defeat of
the divorce referendum is one example of the failure of his agenda.224
Popular support for unification at the expense of "Irishness" also
appears slight at best.2 25 In spite of pleas for a united Ireland from
Northern and Southern republican thinkers, 226 the general population
voted overwhelmingly against the divorce referendum.2 27 Considering
the public's unwillingness to accept divorce despite the lure of national
unity, it appears that the Irish public and government would have
reacted strongly against a decision in favor of Johnston.
While the court was aware of the political situation in Ireland and
may have been influenced by it, such considerations do not justify a find-
ing against Johnston. The court should fulfill its role as arbiter of the
case at hand, deciding on the merits without regard to political repercus-
sions. The Convention's intent is to allow minorities and individuals to
challenge widespread discriminatory beliefs or practices. If the court
failed to find for Johnston because of political concerns, then its effec-
tiveness and usefulness are severely circumscribed.
Conclusion
The European Court of Human Rights wrongly decided the divorce
question in Johnston v. Ireland. It failed to account for the best interests
of the child, Nessa, and to follow the evolving standard of the Court's
own precedent. The court should have found that Ireland's constitu-
tional bar to divorce violated the right to marry, respect for family life,
and freedom of religion under the European Convention on Human
Rights. The court should have required Ireland to allow Roy Johnston
to divorce his wife and marry Janice Williams-Johnston. In the future,
the court should reverse Johnston and recognize divorce as a human
right.
220. See R. BEDDARD, supra note 219, at 46.
221. See generally Hogan, supra note 9, at 92-96.
222. McRedmond, supra note 212.
223. Id.
224. In addition to poor economic conditions, the defeat of the divorce referen-
dum was a major factor in the defeat of FitzGerald's government shortly thereafter.
225. Ireland has vigorously asserted its individuality among nations since gaining
home rule. For information on flourishing Irish culture, see M. O'BRIEN, supra note
6, at 129.
226. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 96.
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The court settled on a compromise solution for the child and
offered no relief to her parents. In doing so, it highlighted Ireland's
refusal to change its Catholic-influenced law and called into question the
effectiveness of the Convention's power of enforcement.
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